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NOTES
AVIATION LAW PROBLEMS IN LITIGATION
ARISING FROM AIRCRAFT DISASTERS

The fatality rate of commercial aviation has fallen considerably in the past
few years, but, as safe as aviation might have become, accidents still occur.' This
Note is concerned with the problems that arise when action is brought against the
airline for injuries sustained in these disasters. The most formidable problem is
evidentiary - marshaling the evidence to prove the liability of the airline. Because
difficulty of proof, a very large number of cases are voluntarily settled before
of the
2
trial.

Another major problem area in the field of aviation accident litigation was
outlined in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,' by Chief Judge Desmond:
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours' duration
pass through several of those commonwealths [that have laws differing
from those of New York]. His plane may meet with disaster in a State he
never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown because of bad
weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic
and end in another. The place of the injury
descent may begin in one State
4
becomes entirely fortuitous.

The applicable law is indeed fortuitous because there is no uniform law of
aviation liability among the several states. Thus, in addition to the problems
connected with gathering evidence, the plaintiff must consider the laws of the
several states - particularly the lex for and the lex loci delictus.

The Standard of Care
The duty owned by the operators of aircraft to their passengers depends upon
whether the aircraft in question is considered to be a private or common carrier.
The operator of a private carrier owes only the duty of ordinary care to his
passengers,5 while a common carrier is charged with the highest degree of care
consistent with the practical operation of its aircraft. 6 This is true for all common
1 Commercial aviation accidents caused 326 deaths in' 1960, for a fatality rate of 1.01
deaths per 100 million passenger miles. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1961, p. 7, col. 1. This
marked an increase over the 1959 statistics of 249 fatalities, with a death rate of 0.7, attributed to domestic air travel, but when compared with the 1934 fatality rate of 9.0 deaths
per 100 million passenger miles, the advances that commercial aviation has made are clearly
seen. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 580 (81st ed. 1960).
The saying that a person is safer in flight than during the drive to the airport is
vividly demonstrated by the 1959 statistics that show a fatality rate -for automobiles of 5.4
per million vehicle miles. Id. at 559.
2 Although no recent statistics are available, it appears that most fatal passenger claims
are settled before trial.
The insurance underwriters' claim and settlement records for airline
passenger claims were examined . . . in 1940. They indicated that . . .
86.3% of the airline fatal passenger claims were voluntarily settled for
substantial amounts and 85.7% of non-scheduled commercial fatal passenger
claims were similarly settled.
Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Essential? - Part I, 19 J. OF AIR LAW & CoMM. 166,
170 (1952).
The highly technical nature of the evidence, with the corresponding difficulty in proving negligence, is recognized by the courts today:
It is now a matter of unhappy but common knowledge that the cause and
circumstances of air tragedy where mass death occurs must be determined
by an examination of the wreckage with an application of the physical facts
discovered to expert knowledge of flight control. By the very nature of the
problem, the proof can seldom rise to the degree of certainty but can often
surpass that of pure speculation.
Underwriters at Lloyds v. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., 288 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1961).
(Emphasis added.)
3 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
4 172 N.E.2d at 527. (Emphasis added.)
5 See, e.g., Scarborough v. Aeroservice, 155 Neb. 749, 53 N.W.2d 902 (1952).
6 See, e.g., Kasanof v. Embry-Riddle Co., 157 Fla. 677, 26 So.2d 889 (1946).
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carriers, whether the particular mode of transportation is firmly established or
relatively new and untried:
If the craft be employed as a common carrier vehicle, it is not a reason for
applying different rules of liability to say that it and the industry are new.
If too new.., should not its owner either decline to use it for the purpose,
or assume the liability incident to the use to which he puts it? 7

The common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, bound to
anticipate unusual and unexpected perils," but rather is normally liable only for
negligence.9 A presumption of negligence is sometimes created against the common
carrier when it is involved in an accident, and some courts have extended this to
common carriers by air.'0 This presumption is rebuttable, but nevertheless the
initial burden is placed on the defendant common carrier.
A common carrier by air is defined by the same characferistics as a common
carrier by other means of transportation - one which holds itself out to the public
as being in the business of transporting passengers from place to place for payment,
offering its services to all who choose to employ it and pay for its use. The distinctive
characteristic of a common carrier is the operation of a business carrying all people
indiscriminately; it may not refuse to do so without just cause.'" Air services2 have
been classified as common carriers where they operated without a schedule,' and
where they ran a sightseeing service.' 3 Thus, most airlines, even the unscheduled
supplementary lines, are common carriers.
4
As noted, the problems involved in proving negligence are difficult.' The
growth or development of the case law with respect to accidents which occur
because of mishaps in bad weather is marked.' 5 The degree of care owed to the
passenger is commensurate with the instrumentality used; as a result, airlines must
use particular care with regard to equipment, 16 crew,' 7 or persons concerned with
the manufacture of the aircraft.' 8
Sources of Evidence

The best source of evidence concerning aircraft disasters is found in the
investigation reports of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The CAB has a statutory
mandate to investigate all airplane accidents and determine the "probable cause"
thereof.' 9 The information gathered from these investigations is available upon
request, but the Board will not release "that portion of the file containing any
7 Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933, 934 (1932).
8 Atcheson v. Braniff International Airways, 327 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959).
9 See, e.g., Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); Jackson v.
Stancil, 253 N.C. 291, 116 S.E.2d 816 (1960); Lunsford v. Tucson Aviation Corp., 73 Ariz.
277, 240 P.2d 545 (1952); Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932).
10 Johnson v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949); Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N.E.2d 131 (1944).
11 See, e.g., Smith v. O'Donnell 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932).
12 McCusker v. Curtiss Wright Flying Service, Inc., 269 Ill.App. 502 (1933).
13 See, e.g., Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, Inc., 321 Ill.App. 340, 53 N.E.2d 131
(1944).
14 See, Sweeny, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential? (pts. 1-2), 19 J. Am
L. & Com. 166, 316 (1952).
15- Compare Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); and Stiles
v. National Air Lines, 161 F.Supp. 125 (E.D.La. 1958); and Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,
300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1957); with Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc.,
1931 U.S.Av. 205 (E.D.Pa. 1931).
16 See, e.g., Foot v Northwest Airways, Inc., 1931 U.S.Av. 66 (D.Minn. 1930).
17 See, e.g., Stiles v. National Air Lines, 161 F.Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958).
18 See, e.g., DeVito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
19 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2): "It shall be the power of the Board
to. . . . investigate such accidents and report the facts, conditions, and circumstances relating to each accident and the probable cause thereof."
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opinion, suggestion, or recommendation of any employee." 2 Still the problem of
proving negligence on the part of the carrier remains a tedious, if not a nearly
impossible task for the plaintiff. The factual situations involved in aviation 'cases
are normally complex; the terminology of the industry must be learned and the
complex scientific knowledge must be comprehended before even the CAB reports
can be reduced to workable data by a plaintiff.
In this age of transcontinental and intercontinental flights, many mishaps
occur great distances from the victim's residence or the place of trial; 21 hence the
use of any available reports becomes a matter of practical importance for the
plaintiff. From these must be gathered most of the specific acts of the defendant
which will later be alleged, and (hopefully) proved, to establish negligence.
Congress, while commanding the CAB to investigate accidents, explicitly refused
to allow the investigating board's reports to be used in negligence suits arising from
commercial aircraft disasters. "No part of any report . . . shall be admitted as
evidence or used in any suit . .. for damages growing out of any matter mentioned
in such reports... 22
The courts, however, have narrowly construed this provision,23 probably in
an effort to have all possible facts on record so that factual issues can be fairly
determined. Since the rules of evidence before the CAB investigating committee
are not the same as before the courts, the purpose of Congress was to preserve the

traditional rules of evidence in the courts:
[T]he report consisted wholly of the investigator's personal observations
about the condition of the plane after the accident. There were in the
report no opinions or conclusions about possible causes of the accident or
defendant's negligence; there were no findings based on interviews or anything but personal observations. Nothing in the report offends either the
opinion or the hearsay rule. § 701(e) [§ 1441(e)] was designed to guard
against the introduction of C.A.B. reports expressing agency views about
matters which are within the functions of courts and juries to decide. 24

Thus, an investigation report is not "used" within the meaning of the statute
when a witness is permitted to refresh his memory from a copy of the investigation
record.25 And the purpose of Congress is not thwarted when a witness "is confronted
20

14 C.F.R. § 311.2:
Information secured by the Board concerning accidents involving aircraft may be released only as follows:

(b) The Washington office. The Director of the Bureau of Safety Investigation or such persons in the Washington office as he may designate, shall,
upon request, release the information described in paragraph (a) of this
section. In addition, the Director or such designee shall, upon request:
(1) Release the names of witness and their addresses;
Make replies as to facts in answer to specific inquiries, either
(2)
verbal or written, concerning aircraft accidents, and shall furnish copies of
documents in accident files, provided the expense of making such copies is
borne by the recipient. In both instances, however, any suggestion, opinion,
or recommendation made by any employee of the Board or any employee of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration, when acting on behalf of the Board,
shall be omitted; and
Make available for inspection that portion of the file containing
(3)
data pertinent to the accident but shall not make available that portion
of the file containing any opinion, suggestion, or recommendation of any
employee of the Board or any employee of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, when acting on behalf of the Board.
21 See, e.g., Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 1 (D. Alaska
1951), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 293 N.Y. 878,
59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
22 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e).
23 See, e.g., Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426 n.2 (2d Cir. 1957); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Ct.App. 1959).
24 Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951).
25 Maxwell v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W.2d 415 (1953).
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with his testimony given at26the investigation in order to refresh his recollection or
impeach him as a witness.

Employees of the CAB may serve as witnesses in civil litigation arising from
aircraft accidents where the evidence they might present is not available from any
other source. CAB employees may not act as expert witnesses when they testify
but must confine 27their testimony to the facts actually observed in the course of
their investigation.
The policy whereby the law grants a privilege against examination of CAB
reports does not extend to accident investigations conducted by the defendant
airlines, 28 and these reports are subject to discovery before trial. 29
Res Ipsa Loquitur
When the injured plaintiff cannot meet the burden of proving specific negligence, he can resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur - a doctrine particularly
adaptable to accidents involving carriers.2 0 However, the application of res ipsa
loquitur, in the case of air carriers has been especially slow, and then often unsuccessful. 31 It appears, however, that corresponding to the advances made by air
Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F.Supp. 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
14 C.F.R. § 311.3:
No Board employee shall make public by testimony in court aircraft
accident information obtained by him in the performance of his official
duties, except in accordance with the following:
(a) Testimony of employees. Employees may serve as witnesses for
the purpose of testifying to the facts observed by them in the course of
accident investigations in those cases in which an appropriate showing has
been made that the facts desired to be adduced are not reasonably available to the party seeking such evidence by any other method, including
the use of discovery procedures against the opposing party. Employees
shall testify only as to facts actually observed by them in the course of
accident investigations and shall not give opinion evidence as expert
witnesses.
28 Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 97 F.Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1950).
29 FED. R. Cirv. P. 34:
Upon motion of any. party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b),
the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit-the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within
the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in
his possession, custody or control; or (2) order any. party to permit entry
upon designated land or other party in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope of the
examination permitted by Rule 26(b). The order shall specify the time,
place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and
photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
For an example of a case in which the plaintiff attempted to establish his case through
26
27

the use of discovery, see, Merrill v. United Air Lines, 151 F.Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

The plaintiff phrased his interrogatories in very broad language: "Is the defendant aware
of any facts or evidence indicating a mechanical mal-function or failure that caused or
contributed to the accident? If so, state the nature of the facts or evidence and the malfunction or failure it indicates. . . . If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the
affirmative, state specifically and in detail what the said claim of the defendant will be."
Id. at 105.
30 See, e.g., Gritsch v. Pickwick Stages System, 131 Cal.App. 774, 22 P.2d 554, 558
(1933): "Originally the doctrine was applicable only in cases against common carriers";
Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, Inc., 209 Iowa 313, 228 N.W. 320, 322 (1929): "The rule
of res ipsa loquitur has been recognized as of peculiar application in actions for negligence
against carriers of passengers."
31

See, Mc Larty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV.

55 (1951).
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travel, the willingness of the courts to apply this doctrine in recent years has
increased .3
In general, there are three criteria set forth which must be met before the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked: the accident must be of the type
that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence; the defendant must
have control of both inspection and use of the instrumentality at the time of the
injury; the injurious occurrence must have happened irrespective of any voluntary
action by the plaintiff at the time of the injury.3 3 An additional requirement has
been sometimes stated, that knowledge of the causes of the accident must be more
readily available to the defendant than to the plaintiff,34 but this condition is not
universally accepted and has been criticized by some commentators.3s
The procedural effects of the doctrine vary in different jurisdictions. In some,
an inference of negligence is created so that the plaintiffs case will withstand a
motion by the defendant for a directed verdict. But the inference is not strong
enough to compel the jury to bring in a verdict for the plaintiff in the absence of
evidence from the defendant. Other courts treat the doctrine as raising a presumption of negligence, requiring a directed verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant
offers no evidence in explanation.36
In the case of commercial air travel it is clear that the plaintiff has no control
over the plane at the time of the accident.37 In the case of private carriers, especially
where the plane was equipped with dual controls and where the possibility that
the passenger had control of the plane existed, the courts have not allowed the
application of res ipsa loquitur.3s Some courts have held, particularly in the early
years of aviation, that adverse weather conditions deprived the defendant of absolute
control over the aircraft, and therefore refused to apply the doctrine.3 9
32 Compare Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F.Supp. 940 (D.D.C.
1948), with Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 17 F.Supp. 865 (D. Wyo. 1937).
33 9 WIOMORE, EvIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
34 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.5 (1956).
35 PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
36 See, Id. at § 43.
37 In fact, Federal legislation has recently made it a crime for a passenger to wrest
away control of an airliner from the carrier's flight personnel:
(i) (1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as
herein defined, shall be punished (A) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or,
in the case of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant
has waived a trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order; or
(B) by imprisonment .for not less than twenty years, if the death
penalty is not imposed.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "aircraft piracy" means
any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force
or violence and with wrongful intent, of any aircraft in flight in air commerce.
(j) Whoever, while aboard an aircraft in flight in air commerce,
assaults, intimidates, or threatens any flight crew member or flight attendant
(including any steward or stewardess) of such aircraft, so as to interfere with
the performance by such member or attendant of his duties or lessen the
ability of such member or attendant to perform his duties, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 75 Stat. 466 (1961),
49 U.S.C. 1472.
38 See, e.g., Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., 64 S.D. 243, 266 N.W. 253 (1936);
Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 668, 52 P.2d 226 (1935).
39 See, Herndon v. Gregory, 81 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Ark. 1935):
[O]ne taking flight in an aircraft assumes certain apparent risks in this
mode of travel which are of greater hazard than travel on land or water.
Not only are the laws of gravitation being defied, but a high rate of speed
is attained and peril from the elements is greater. The inherent nature and
risk of travel at great speed and altitude at the same time requires a high

NOTES
Since the contributory conduct of the plaintiff usually has no bearing on the
cause of the accident, the application of res ipsa loquitur cannot be precluded on
the grounds that the plaintiffs voluntary action had an effect on the injury
complained of. Even early cases recognized that there is no assumption of risk
by the plaintiff merely because he chose to travel by air, although one commentator
has said that, "[A]n airplane soaring into the wild blue yonder is subject to the 'perils
of the air' even as a vessel embarking upon an ocean voyage is subject to the 'perils
of the sea.' "'4o
It is with respect to the requirement that the accident must be of the type that
ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence that the courts have most
often refused to apply the doctrine, especially in the earlier cases. Most often it is
said that the aircraft could fail
for any number of causes over which the operator
4
of the plane had no control. 1
Our daily newspapers are replete with airplane accidents, the solution of
which will never be known .... [T]he causes of accidents attributable to
carelessness or negligence are but a small percentage of all the causes which
are known in this young but growing enterprise. It is definitely known that
the presence of air pockets, cross-currents, clouds, fog, mists, and a variety
of. climatic conditions bring about disaster for which no one is responsible,
except it might be said that he who assumes to fly must look well to his
own fate. 42
But with modem apparatus improving the mechanical operation of aircraft, mechanical failures at the present time would seem less likely to occur in the face of

adverse weather conditions. Thus it appears that human errors tend to account
for the greater proportion of the mishaps. Acts of God would relieve the defendant
of liability but the courts are recognizing, in view of modem storm detection and
tracking devices, that weather conditions are highly predictable, so that the operator
might be guilty of negligence for flying in the particular area at that time:
[W]here science, does afford or comes to afford a forewarning of a weather
condition attended by the probability or reasonable likelihood of a hazard
of dangerous turbulehce, it would be too much to say that the airline need
not anticipate and take the commensurate precautions reasonably available
to guard against the hazard; and where the means or precautions, in given
circumstances, of avoiding the hazard of dangerous turbulence are known
... the failure to take such specific commensurate precautions . . . constitutes negligence. 43

The slight possibility that the accident occurred because of an act of God
should not preclude the application of res ipsa. With each advance in aircraft
technology, it would seem more improbable that a given accident was due to an
act of God, and more probable that some negligent act on the part of the airline
was responsible.
With respect to the requirement that evidence of the true explanation of the
accident be more accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff, one commentator
has concluded that since the CAB conducts extensive investigations concerning the
causes of accidents, the plaintiff has as much knowledge as the defendant:
When all of the evidence is assembled it is presented at a public hearing,
and the Board subsequently isues [sic] a report of its findings, giving to one
degree of care in the construction, inspection and navigation of an airpline.
However, faulty construction of the airplane, or negligence in its management in flight, enter very little into consideration of the cause of loss of
many flyers who attempted a trans-oceanic flight and have never since been
heard from. Many of the most skillful and best trained aviators, using the
best constructed airplanes obtainable, have been lost. Usually public opinion presumes such loss attributable to storms, fog, air currents and other
hazards of such travel.
40 McLarty, supra note 31, at 72.
41 See, e.g., Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 17 F.Supp. 865 (D.Wyo.
1937); Deojay v. Lyford, 139 Me. 234, 29 A.2d 111 (1942); Herndon v. Gregory, 17 Ark.
702, 81 S.W.2d 849 (1935).
42 Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 17 F.Supp. 865, 867 (D.Wyo. 1937).
43 Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Mo. 1957).
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and all every bit of available information on the cause of the accident.
How then can it be said that the airline has superior knowledge of the
cause of the accident or superior means of obtaining that knowledge?"
The court in Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp.45 provided an
account to the question.
It is further argued that since the Civil Aeronautics Board conducts
an inquiry into every aircraft disaster and embodies its findings in a public
report, the plaintiff and the defendant are on a parity in respect to access
to information as to the causes of such catastrophe. If this line of argument were determinative of the question at issue, it would apply equally
to railroad wrecks, since they are investigated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This circumstance, however, has never been deemed a ground
for denying the application of res ipsa loquitur to railroads.46
In Haasman v. PacificAlaska Air Express,47 the court also faced the applicability
of res ipsa loquitur. There an airplane disappeared near Sitka on a day when no
storm conditions prevailed in the area. No trace of the plane, its cargo or passengers
was found. The court, allowing application of the doctrine, said: "The rule precluding the application of the doctrine where the plaintiffs knowledge is equal to
that of the defendant.., is applied to cases where the plaintiff has equal knowledge
or where knowledge of the cause is equally accessible to the plaintiff - not to cases
in which there is an equality of ignorance as in the present case." 48
There is a sharp conflict of authority as to whether specific acts of negligence
may be alleged or introduced in evidence when the doctriie of res ipsa loquitur is
invoked. The conflict is well illustrated in the aviation cases.
The courts have taken divergent positions: (1) that by specific allegations of
negligence, the plaintiff has lost his right to rely on the doctrine; (2) that the
plaintiff may take advantage of the doctrine if the inference of .negligence to be
drawn supports the specific allegations; (3) that the doctrine may be applied only
if a general allegation of negligence accompanies the specific pleading; and
(4)
49
that the doctrine is available without regards to the form of the pleading.
In Goodheart v. American Airlines,50 the plaintiff alleged that the pilot was
negligent because, among other things, he deviated from the course he was directed
to follow and took a course over a mountainous area at an unsafe altitude. The
court held that to submit the case to the jury on a theory of res ipsa was clearly
in error because the doctrine "is a rule of necessity, to be invoked only when...
direct evidence is absent and not readily available."'" In Johnson v. Western Air
Express Corp.,52 the California court upheld the trial judge's refusal to instruct
the jury on res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiff had relied on specific acts of
negligence.
Lobel v. American Airlines,53 applying New York law, distinguished Goodheart,
and held that the doctrine was applicable even though the plaintiff was able to
obtain information on cross-examination as to specific acts of negligence that might
have caused the accident.
We assume the New York Courts would oppose any rule which encouraged
plaintiffs to go easy on defendants in cross-examination and which destroyed this truth-testing technique in res ipsa loquitur cases, for the information elicited under cross-examination helps the jury to decide intelligently
whether or not a permissible inference of negligence should be drawn. 54
44
45

McLarty, supra note 31, at 77.
76 F.Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948).

46

Id, at 944-45.

47 100 F.Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951), aff'd per curiam sub norn., Des Marais v. Beckman,
198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
48 Id. at 2.
49 Paoss.R, TORTS § 43 (2d ed. 1955).
50 1 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. Div. 1937).
51 Id. at 291.
52 45 Cal.App. 614, 114 P.2d 688 (1941).
53 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
54 Id. at 220.
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In a 1959 case decided by the Second Circuit, the court held that under New
York law, the jury was properly instructed as to res ipsa even though plaintiffs
proof suggested that the crash might have been caused by negligence on the part
of the pilot in flying too low, since the latter might not have been the only cause
of the accident. 55
The problems confronting the plaintiff in successfully maintaining an action
against an airline for negligence can be grouped into two general categories: the
divergence of the laws of the several states with respect to aviation accidents, whatever law is applicable being almost "fortuitous"; and the formidable task of proving
the defendant's negligence. Attempts toward solving these problems - uniformity
of law, and calling the carrier to the fore to explain the accident - have been made
by the so-called "Warsaw Convention!' and the Uniform Aviation Liability Act of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Legislation.
International Air Travel
Liability rules for aviation accidents involving injury to passengers, baggage or
goods in international air travel are prescribed by the "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air" - the
"Warsaw Convention" of 1929. The United States, though not a signatory to the
Convention, became a party to it in 1934.6 With international flights a common
occurrence today, the Warsaw Convention is of highly practical importance.
Secretary of State Hull expressed the underlying policy of that Article of
the Convention which gives the injured passenger a limited amount of damages
in return for holding the carrier to almost absolute liability in a letter of transmittal
to President Roosevelt, urging the acceptance of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States.
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only
be beneficial to passengers ... as affording a more definite basis of recovery
and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be an aid in the
development of international air transportation, as such limitation will
afford the carrier a more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain
insurance rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a
reduction of operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers
...in the way of reduced transportation charges. 57

In Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,58 the court said that the purpose
of the Warsaw Convention was "to unify rules relating to international transportation by air."59 And one commentator wrote, along the same lines as Secretary
Hull that, "The plan of liability embodied in the Warsaw Convention ... appears
to have been designed in part to promote international aviation by relieving it of
certain liabilities." 60
In the United States, any attempted limitation of liability by a common carrier,
based on contract, has been struck down by the courts as a violation of public
policy and therefore void. 61 However, with respect to the Warsaw Convention:
"The public policy . . . must bow to the overriding policy of the treaty." 62 The
Convention takes effect automatically when the required conditions are met; "[T]he

Convention has automatic full impact, by its own terms and not because the parties

55 Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
56 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
57 S. Doc. ExEc. 0., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
58 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 1945), cert. denied, 295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 59 (1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741.
59 Id. at 322.
60 Sweeny, supra note 14, at 183. (Emphasis added.)
61 See, e.g., Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692
(Ct. App. 1935).
62 Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F.Supp. 338
340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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have so agreed."' Of the Convention countries there is probably more criticism
of the limitation on liability in the United States than elsewhere. "[T]he main
or non-liability, to the
interest . . . has been transposed from 6the
4 problem: liability
question of limited-unlimited liability."
The Warsaw Convention applies "to all international transportation of persons,
baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire."6 5 The Convention defines "international transportation" as "any transportation in which, according to the contract
made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the transportation . . . are situated either within the

territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within ihe territory of a single High
Contracting Power, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject
to the sovereignty . . . of another power, even though that power is not a party to

this convention." 66 Thus when the passenger ticket states that the transportation
is subject to the rules of the Convention relating to liability, the route designated
on the ticket, especially as to the place of departure and destination, determines
whether the provisions of the Convention are applicable.
The effect of the Convention, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary
between the airline and the passenger, is to set a limit on the liability of the airline
in return for shifting the burden of proof regarding the airline's negligence from the
plaintiff to the defendant. Any agreement waiving the liability limits must set
higher limits of liability.67 The maximum amount recoverable against the airline

is the equivalent of $8,291.87 for the injury to or the death of a passenger. 68
In Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,6 9 the court said: "The Warsaw Con-

vention rules .. . raise a presumption of liability on the part of the carrier for injury
or death to a passenger... .",7o and in Garcia: "The Warsaw Convention contains,
not only a limitation of liability ... but a declaration of liability on the part of the
carrier ... ., 71 The presumption or declaration of liability on the part of the carrier

can be defeated if the carrier is able to prove that "all necessary measures to avoid
the damage"' 72 had been taken or that "it was impossible... to take such measures.
[T]he overwhelming majority of the authors has construed "all necessary

'7

measures" as including a requirement for the exercising of due diligence -

or the diligence of a bonus pater familias. . . . The same view has also
been expressed by stating that "all necessary measures" are equivalent to
"reasonable measures," . . . or that the carrier is not liable when no fault
has been committed.... 74

In the case of damage by "dol" (officially translated as "wilful misconduct") 7 5
by the carrier or its agents the liability limitations do not apply.76 There has been
63 Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949).
64 Hjalsted, The Air Carrier'sLiability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage in International Air Law - Part II, 27 J. Am LAw & Comm. 119, 124 (1960).
65 49 STAT. 3000, 3014, Art. 1(1) (1934).

66 Id. at Art. 1(2).

67 Id. at Art. 22(1).
68 Ibid.
69 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. Trial Term 1943), aff'd mem., 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App.
Div. 1944), motion for leave to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div.), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 882 (1945).
70 Id. at 422.
71 Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (App. Div. 1945), cert.
denied, 295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 59 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741. (Emphasis added.)
72 49 STAT. 3000, 3019 (1934), Art. 20(1).
73. Ibid.
74 Hjalsted, The Air Carrier'sLiability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage in International Air Law - Part I, 27 J. Am LAw & Comm. 1, 9 (1960).
75 49 STAT. 3000, 3014, Art. 25(1) (1934).
76 Ibid. See, Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law, 197 (1954):
"Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention requires 'dol' or 'une faute qui, d'aprs la loi
du tribunal saise, est consider~e comme 6quivalente au dol.' This is probably the most unhappy phrase of the entire Convention. It is the result and the starting point of a comedy

of errors."
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some problem in interpretation of the Warsaw Convention with respect to whether
may be sued in an effort to circumvent the damage
the agents of the carrier
7
limitation provision.

The Convention provides for a two-year statute of limitations, 78 but aside
from that, with the exception of certain venue restrictions,7" the procedural questions
arising in a case in which the Convention applies are governed by the court's
own law.80
Uniform Legislation
In the early days of commercial aviation a joint committee was formed by
the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute and the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to study the problems arising from aviation
accidents. Because their study showed that at the time it was almost impossible
for plaintiffs to find probable evidence of the cause of an accident, they recommended
that a common carrier by air be made absolutely liable for death or injury to its
passengers. 8 ' Their recommendations were carried into the code accepted by the
National Commissioners:
The Legislature finds as a fact that it is rarely possible for individuals
who have been injured or for personal representatives of individuals who
have been killed . .. as the result of an aircraft accident, to establish the
cause of the accident. Public policy demands that compensation should not
be denied to any person because of his inability to prove negligence or his
inability to rebut evidence offered by operators of aircraft that they were
not guilty of negligence. It is primarily for this reason that certain provisions of this act impose liability upon operators of aircraft regardless of
negligence. 82

The approved draft provided for absolute liability,88 unless the injury was
77 Compare Chutter v. KLM, 132 F.Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); with Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F.Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
78 49 STAT. 3000, 3021, Art. 29(1) (1934). See, e.g., Chutter v. KLM, 132 F.Supp.

611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
79
80

49 STAT. 3000, 3020 Art. 28(1) (1934).
Id. at 3021, Art. 28(2).

81

See remarks of Mr. William A. Schnader, in
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The argument is made, why should there be a different rule of liability
applied to aircraft, to automobiles, and to railways? The answer is that in
the case of airplane accidents, it is almost impossible for the plaintiff to
find probable evidence of the cause of the accident.
UNIFORM AVIATION LIABILITY ACT § 103 (1938).
Id. at § 301-02:
Section 301. Scope of Article.
(a)
This article shall apply to all bodily injuries to passengers of aircraft carrying any passengers for compensation, and death resulting therefrom if such injuries occurred within this State or if the contract of
carriage was made within this State even if the injuries occurred outside
this State. '
(b) This article shall not apply to bodily injuries or to death of
passengers of aircraft not carrying any passengers for compensation. Liability for such injuries and death shall be determined according to the (common law or under the statutes of this State relating to recovery of damages
by guests).
Section 302. (Absolute Liability Imposed.) In cases within the scope
of this article, the operator of an aircraft shall be liable to the extent hereafter in this article specified.
(a) Regardless of negligence, for bodily injury and for death resulting therefrom, to a passenger, arising out of and in the course of the
passenger-air carrier relations; and
(b) For bodily injury to a passenger and for death resulting therefrom, not arising out of and in the course of the passenger-air carrier relation, if the passenger or his personal representative shall prove that the injury was caused by the negligence of the operator of the aircraft. In any
such case there shall be no presumption of negligence against the operator.
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caused by the passenger's wilful misconduct.8 4 The act followed the same principle
as the Warsaw Convention and gave the injured passenger a limitation of his
damages in consideration for the carrier's being held absolutely liable.
This Uniform Aviation Liability Act was approved by the Commissioners in
1938, but later approval was withdrawn so that other groups could study it. In
1948 it was recommended by the Committee on the Uniform Aeronautics Code
that the theory of the Act be changed "from that of absolute liability to that of a
rebuttable presumption, or to provide that the carrier must prove that8 5its
negligence
s
was not the proximate cause of the injury or death complained of."
After this basic change in theory, no amended drafts were submitted for
approval by the National Commissioners. In 1956, it was recommended that a new
aeronautical code be drafted:
... were prepared more than 20 years ago. Since their preparation the
development of aeronautical law . . . [has] brought developments which
render the provisions of these original Acts insufficient in many areas to
cover the need of State legislation. .-. . The Committee feels that in some
All of the above mentioned uniform Acts in the field of Aeronautical law
of the areas in which states may act to the extent that the same has not
been preempted by the Federal Government, the availability of State legislation will tend to retard the assumption of additional federal authority.86
No new code had been submitted to the Commissioners through their 1960
annual conference.
Conclusion
The evidence problems in aircraft accident litigation are formidable, yet they
must be surmounted if the plaintiff is to be successful. On the basis of available
evidence, the plaintiff has to make an initial decision of great importance to his
case - the selection of the forum. The best forum will have to be chosen, after
the preliminary questions of jurisdiction and venue have been answered, on an
analysis of a series of factors.
Among the first factors to be considered is the quality of the evidence. If there
is a possibility that specific negligence can be alleged and proved, a favorable
forum would be one, for example, where both specific negligence and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur could be alleged by the plaintiff. If the evidence points to the
possibility that the crash occurred because of some defect in design or manufacture,
then a favorable strategy would be to join the manufacturer and airline as codefendants, and the forum chosen would have to be one that recognizes actions
for breach of warranty even though there is no privity of contract between the
injured plaintiff and the manufacturer.8 7 Another factor that the plaintiff has to
84 Id. at § 303: "Section 303. (Exception.) The operator of an aircraft shall not be
liable for bodily injury to a passenger or death resulting therefrom, if the injury was caused
by the passenger's wilful misconduct."
85 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEvENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 149 (1948).
86 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 179-80 (1956).
87

When an action is grounded on alleged breach of warranty for a particular purpose,

the courts generally require that there be privity of contract between the parties before the
action can proceed. However, this requirement has been under constant attack, and a growing number of courts are allowing recovery on these grounds even though there is no privity.
There are two approaches that have been taken by the courts to reach this result: (1) the
exemption of certain products, especially products for human consumption, from the privity
requirement; (2) the extension of privity beyond the immediate purchaser to others who

would be contemplated to use the product at the time it was purchased.
Cases involving suits by injured passengers against the manufacturers of -aircraft,

when they have been allowed to proceed even though there is no privity, have taken both
of these approaches. An illustration of a case in which aircraft were exempted from the
privity requirement is Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,975 (S.D.N.Y. 1960):
The same considerations which have prompted the demise of the privity
requisite in negligence actions and in implied warranty actions involving
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weigh before selecting the forum is the liberality of the "discovery" procedures in
the possible forums, especially if there is the possibility that specific negligence might
be proved or if the courts might be against the application of res ipsa loquitur in
aviation disaster cases.
These factors are relevant in determining strategy in general litigation, but
much more so in the field of aviation accident liability. Clearly, the picture of mass
88
dissimilarity among the states, since "the place of the injury is entirely fortuitous,"
calls for a re-examination of the present scheme. The passenger injured in a domestic
aviation disaster cannot go to one body of law as can the international air traveler,
but instead must plan his case around the varying laws of the state of the injury,
the forum state and perhaps the state where the contract of transportation was
entered into. When this same situation confronted international aviation, a uniform
system of liability was considered best; uniform legislation governing domestic
aviation liability might solve some of the problems caused by these varying laws.
"In light of the extensive and common use of the airplane in modern times with
most flights traversing states beyond the point of origin, the vagaries of different...
event of accident may make it desirable that earlier
acts coming into play in the
doctrines be reconsidered." 8 9
Some commentators have urged that immediate action be taken, and that this
action be taken on the national level. The argument is that uniformity is necessary;
by waiting for the fifty state legislatures to act, immediate uniformity is most
food are present in the breach of warranty action involving an aircraft.
The nature of this product is one which may well place life and limb in
danger if the product is defective. Id. at 17,978.
See also, Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 6 Av. Cas. 17,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Conlon
v. Republic Aviation Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,982 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Other cases have taken the approach that the case could proceed against the manufacturer, because the passenger was expected to be affected by the goods. See, e.g., Garon v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 29 U.S.L. WEEK 2584 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1961): "The passenger
• . . should be considered to be in the "commercial family" of the purchaser Northwest Airlines, . . . and therefore, the passenger Mickus stands in such privity to the manufacturer as
to be covered by the warranty made by the manufacturer to the purchaser Northwest
Airlines."
See also, Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F.Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959): "The conclusion seems to be that the duty extends to anyone who may reasonably be expected to be
in the vicinity of the chattel's probable use and to be endangered if it is defective." Id. at 34.
These cases, however, represent only the landmarks, and the general rule remains
that a person injured because of some defect in design or manufacture of the aircraft cannot
recover unless he is in privity of contract with the manufacturer. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
American Airlines, Inc., 199 N.Y.S.2d 134, 23 Misc. 2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mem.,
214 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (App. Div. 1961):
It must be conceded that the efforts to extend the doctrine of liability for

breach of warranty, proceeding, as they do, on emotional rather than
logical grounds, produce situations which are not easily resolved by reason.
Basic principles are lost sight of or ignored. The consequences may be selfdefeating. In this case extending plaintiff's theory to its next step, there
would be no objection to suit against the person who supplied the manufacturer with either machinery, appliances or material. And then would
come the one who did the same for that manufacturer or supplier until
the chain of liability extended back to such a degree that a trial would
involve so many parties and issues as not to be justiciable. Id. at 136.
But see Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E. 2d 773 (1961).
For commentaries on the airplane manufacturers' liability, discussing liability in cases
proceeding both on the theory of negligence and on the theory of breach of warranty, see
generally, Murray, Aircraft Manufacturers' and Overhaulers Liability for Defects in ConThe Extension of the Macrherson v. Buick Rule from
structian, Design and Overhaul the Terrestrial to the Celestial, 13 U. MAvM L. REv. 189 (1958); Comment, 1953 Wis. L.
REV. 109.
88 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
89 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F.Supp. 97, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

